

X: May I ask you something?

Y: ...well, feel free.

X: But the question I have cannot be answered?

Y: So, why do ask me then?

X: Because then we share at least the same problem.

Y: This is very kind of you. But go on with it, ask!

X: Can we say the time has changed but the place is the same?

Y: Excuse me, say it again?!

X: I knew you wouldn't like it. Can we say: The time has changed but the place is the same?

Y: The time has changed ... but the place is the same. Well, isn't it ... why do you ask?

X: You remember the day after the election. You woke up in the morning and realized that this is the first day of the new government – a government you didn't vote for. You look out of your window and everything seems to look like yesterday, but you know it's not.

Y: Yes, I remember very well.

X: The image is the same but the meaning is totally different. It feels like a sort of alienation. You recognize the street in front of your window, you see the same people waiting for the bus, as yesterday. What comes into your mind is the percentage of people who have been voting for the party.

Y: 27 percent. I know. Every third person voted for it.

X: Look out of the window. The people waiting for the bus down there are unknown to you, you don't know one of them. But you start to count: one two three, one two three, and one more time: one two three.

Y: Yes, that makes three out of nine.

X: You don't know them ... but you know something: Statistically at least three of them are people you would never like to share the same room with. They behave as if nothing has happened. Leaving the building as every day

and waiting for the bus. The image is the same. The street looks the same and even the weather is the same. Yet what looks like the same is not the same anymore. The time has changed but the view is the same. What does it mean if the view is the same but if it means something different? Does it mean that the view – or let's put it more abstract – does it mean that the visibility has lost its informational value?

Y: but ... does the street really still look the same? ... maybe you don't know yet, maybe visibility belongs to another mode of temporality.

X: ...to another mode of temporality?

Y: ...yes, maybe there is a certain delay in being able to perceive the same space differently...

X: ...a delay in perception?

Y: ...just like when you encounter a totally different, disturbing detail about a certain person you know, or better, you thought you really knew. What does 'knowing someone' mean anyway?

X: ...tell me!

Y: A construction of a certain image, a specific 'clothing' around a person, a kind of frame or maybe better, a stage, on which a certain role is being acted out? And then some disturbing information about this person hits you and your neatly produced image right in the face. And then ... does the image really still look the same?

X: ...well, I guess it depends on what you're looking for.

Y: After a while, you will see different details, different meanings in the scenery around this person. Looking back you might remember details you never realised before. And after a while the whole space might be turned upside down even in retrospect. Maybe it's this time-lag, this inertia in adapting to a new situation which is so disturbing, even frightening.

X: ...a delay in perception whilst I'm perceiving?

Y: ...it points you to the constructed and contingent nature of your look. Maybe this is a moment when the desire to synchronise your own view with the gaze, which is imposed on you from outside, runs into a dead end. Maybe the unspeakable always has already been there, just you couldn't see it. Maybe your visibility was informed by a certain mode, which has been shattered.

X: Definitely!

Y: ...You could say visibility then is an effect of knowledge and information, but still it belongs to a different temporal regime. One which is infused by memory and desire. Maybe it's not so much that visibility has lost its informational

value, but that informational value produces a rupture, a delay in the temporal structure of visibility...

X: What you're saying here is in short: I just see what I know ... or I can only find what I'm looking for. So to put it in other words: Visibility is just the product of my knowledge and desire.

Y: Exactly!

X: If you're talking about the gaze and the look, and even the contingent nature of the look, then you're following an argumentation based on psychoanalytical theories. And with the reference to psychoanalytical theories your arguments rely on the notion of a subject, a human subject and its perception.

Y: ...well, but...

X: ...but talking about the view out of my window and facing an urban environment – can we still say what we see is the product of human knowledge and desire, or even more abstract: Is it possible to think society still as a human product? Is the city a product of human knowledge and desire? Can we think society as a simple multiplicity of single subjects?

Y: ...any alternatives in mind?

X: My argument is based less on a rupture but on a gap between the subject and its social environment ... saying that the human subject could have the idea of not being part of the society anymore and *vice versa*: being part of the society means not representing a subject anymore. So the temporality you're talking about is in my view the notion of a permanent ambivalence of a subjective space and a social space which are not coherent anymore.

Y: What you're saying is: whatever you choose, you lose.

X: ...yes, paradoxically then neither the subject is mine anymore nor is it the society. To put it spatially: Neither my private apartment is mine anymore nor is it the city. Privacy and publicity are products of a modernist discourse, and even the crisis of privacy and publicity is just the crisis of modernism. So, to use your concept of temporality: Is it a delay of modernism I'm facing here?

Y: ...but, as notions of publicity and privacy were produced by a modernist discourse, the notion of a coherence between the subject and society itself could be seen as an idea based in modernist thought. And if this correlating idea of visibility and space as we knew it was built up around the constraints and needs of a bourgeois subject, which defined society, then the question would be, what kind of subject we are talking about anyway...

X: ...well, a good question: What kind of subject are we talking about anyway?

I told you that I have my problems with the notion of a subject and the society at the same time. I do not really feel familiar with neither the subject nor the society. As it seems, both do not belong to my identity. So I could say my identity is a kind of temporal configuration – a reference to specific spatial and social situations ... not really an echo, but more a kind of reflection.

Y: ...or another mode of temporality...

X: The only reference that I have to deal with is my body, a psychophysical space that permanently reflects the space around it ... No matter if my body identifies with the space around it and becomes part of its surroundings ... or if it is the opposite that I can feel like a spaceship ... just landed somewhere and being very aware of the difference between my space and my surroundings – like walking around like an alien.

Y: ...like an alien? ... What you are saying here reminds me a lot of the writings of Walter Benjamin...

X: Walter Benjamin?

Y: Yes, on the *flâneur* of the 19th century – a figure floating in midst of the metropolitan crowds of the industrialised, modern city ... embedded in the play of signs ... feeling somehow at home in his/her self-produced aliatedness (alienation). And it also reminds me of the desire of the *flâneur* to transform a social, political body into a somehow distanced observer, turning the seemingly disturbing outside into his/her inside or even home, turning notions of privacy and publicity upside down. So the *flâneur* felt sort of at home in the outside, the alienating city, the spatial other. And if the construction of subjectivity always needs a repressed other, an outside to itself, what kind of spatial setting would that it be in your case?

X: Well, your question is still based on the notions of the inside and the outside. And if you are mentioning Benjamin's *flâneur*, then you are referring to another modernist figure, no matter if the relations of inside and outside are inverted. My idea of alienation, of feeling like an alien ... is somehow different.

Y: Tell me...

X: ...well, maybe I could say that my notion of space is just the notion of an outside ... saying ... there is no inside at all ... no inside of my body, no inside of any space.

Y: ... but no inside at all ...

X: ... if you're asking now that the outside needs an inside to be an outside then I would refer to Martin Heidegger who was talking about the unhomely ... which he called the *Unzuhaue*. As far as I remember he said that the only

home is the unhomely ... being at home means exactly that there is no home anymore. And a spatial setting representing this unhomeliness could be the notion of an urban environment without a name, a city that has lost its name ... maybe something that Rem Koolhaas called the city without qualities.

Y: Well, I guess it's a matter of representation. Even if there might be no home anymore, the unhomely still rests on the idea of a home, the representation of a seemingly safe inside. Still, the definition of space itself rests on modernist figures like inside or outside, even if they might exist merely by virtue of their repression of a fundamental unhomeliness. Also Jacques Derrida, in his reading of Heidegger, refers to a concept of an inside, which is structured by the economy of representation. So in his account the home is something like a mask ... a mask which suppresses the fundamental unhomeliness. And even if there might be no home anymore, still there are representations of home, of inside and outside. And these representations still continue to define our thinking about space, our talking about space.

X: ...do you associate representation with a form of masking then?

Y: ...no, maybe it's a matter of acknowledging the structural weakness, the construction and subsequent contingency of definitions like that.

X: Let's turn it around: Let's say there is a house and aside it another one and another one ... Let's imagine there are a million houses one aside the other. Let's even say that every house represents a home – a home that represents an inside. One million insides. Now: what happens if we call this one million insides a city? Is this city then representing an inside itself? A city that consists of one million homes and houses and insides? Is the city just the result of the buildings it is 'including'?

Y: But ... just a moment ... I think we should be careful about the way in which we use terms like inside and outside. Are we talking about a spatial figure of inside and outside or are we talking about a theoretical concept referring to the status of the subject?

X: ...well, how can you separate the one from the other, isn't a subject always linked to a notion of space?

Y: ...of course, sometimes these notions overlap ... Already Mark Wigley or Beatriz Colomina analysed the structural weakness of these dialectical modernist distinctions, showing how space is defined by its surfaces, its masks and its representations.

X: ...yes, as Wigley noted: space is just an extension of a surface, a product of projection...

Y: Here architecture is seen like a kind of screen, on which the social and political implications are negotiated and meanings are inscribed. Even if they show how obsolete a primarily spatial understanding of inside *versus* outside or public *versus* private might be; they also try to make visible the ideological operations at work in the process of identity-formation alongside those representations.

X: ...saying that space is not a given surrounding, not a container but a result of power struggle and gender trouble...

Y: ...which leads to a thinking of space that takes into account the constructions and representations of space that happen before its physical manifestations. And, like Laclau/Mouffe have argued, questions of hegemony and identity have to be negotiated along representations of inside and outside, even if they might be contingent. But still, this concept is not confined primarily to space, but to social formations. So I think first we have to differentiate the concepts, in which terms like inside or outside are applied.

X: Well, ... what you are saying is that thinking about identity is linked to a concept of inside and outside. To put it clearly: To identify with something means to look at it as an inside and *vice versa*: if you do not identify with something then it is representing an outside. As far as I remember it was the same Chantal Mouffe who said that a liberal or even neo-liberal notion of identity is based on this concept of inside and outside, on the notion of members of my society and foreigners.

Y: ...yes, the distinction of me and the others, a notion of othering...

X: ...she said in order to create the notion of an inside and an identity it is necessary to create an outside, a moment of differentiation, in short: a political and cultural difference that decides who and what is included or excluded.

Y: ...yes, to stabilize the phantasma of an inside via the exclusion of an outside.

X: ...yes, a practice that was described very well in Frantz Fanon's *Black Skin White Masks*. The notion of an inside space like a nation or a city or a house is just the extension of this concept. But you also mentioned Jacques Derrida; and he offered another meaning of difference that he called *différance*. And it was Fredric Jameson, who referred to Derrida's difference, saying that the difference is the only moment that the things have in common.

Y: ...relationship through difference...

X: ...so difference is not something that splits reality into an inside and outside, but difference is the common denominator, to quote Jameson: difference relates.

Y: Yes, exactly. But here we come back to the starting point of our discussion: when you were talking about a gap between the subject and the social environment, you also implement a certain concept of difference...

X: ...yes, a difference inherent to meaning...

Y: ...a concept maybe, where difference is neither One nor the Other, but something in-between; – something, which is inscribed in every definition of a spatial or subjective dimension. But to come back to one of my earlier points: Maybe your specific form of aliatedness nevertheless has to do with a gap in temporality, a failure in the attempt to synchronise yourself with the world around you ... a gap in temporality, maybe something Homi K. Bhabha referred to as a 'third space'. A concept of space, where the non-synchronous temporalities of global and national cultures open up a cultural space, a third space. A space, which cannot be grasped in terms of spatial distance or dialectics, but a space located more in a kind of interstitial future that emerges between the conflictual cultural temporalities. A concept of difference which cannot be represented in a synchronous and spatial way anymore.

X: Well ... if you talk about cultural temporalities or even in general ... about the cultural itself ... the cultural cannot be represented in a synchronous and spatial way ... what is the reference for a culture then if it is neither a synchronous time nor a common space that people share? Let's take Tallinn here as an example: We find ourselves right now in Tallinn, and Tallinn is a city in Estonia. What I've heard is that some people think of Tallinn even as an Estonian city?!

Y: ...yes, a city representing a nation, a phantasma...

X: Now: what does a third space mean here? ... a space in-between? What we can see here is a city that looks like a typical European city with a historical centre and some spots of contemporary or recent architecture. We can call that a mix of cultural temporalities. Let's imagine a person now who has a somehow nationalistic character and tries to identify with just the spots representing a time when Estonia had a status of national or cultural sovereignty ... if you like a kind of inside view. I mean we know that this person may be wrong, but ... this person will not identify with any kind of architecture or cultural temporalities that are lacking of something specific Estonian. It will find itself as an alien in a changed world, ... being in Estonia but missing something Estonian whatever that would be. This person will find itself in a third space, in a space in-between.

Y: ...yes, because it tries to synchronize different temporalities...

X: ...and now let's imagine another person who does not care about the Estonian character of the city at all and identifies only with the needs of a contemporary economical and technical infrastructure. This person lives in a space in-between as well, because the contemporary infrastructure creates a space nearly indifferent to different places. With the spatial indifference in mind this person probably feels like an alien in a specific Estonian environment it does not identify with.

Y: ...the same problem in reverse...

X: We could say that these two persons feel like aliens in Tallinn even if their perspectives are totally different. Both fail to feel at home. But what they have in common is paradoxically their disagreement, if you like their 'outsideness'.

Y: ...as Jameson said...

X: ...difference relates ... If I got you right it is not only a matter of identification with a cultural temporality, but as well a matter of identification with the difference.

Y: ...absolutely, yet I would argue that these two examples of alienation you described, cannot be discussed anymore in terms of spatial representations primarily, but that they are structured by conflictual, overlapping temporalities. As Victor Burgin put it: The city in our actual experience is at the same time an actually existing environment, and a city in a novel, a film, a photograph, a city seen on television, a city in a comic strip, a city in a pie-chart, and so on. And, I would add, structured by all the different temporalities that come with it, like in the concept of Deleuze's Time-Image. In that sense I really can locate myself only within difference, or maybe better: in a flow of difference in both spatial and temporal terms, that have to be negotiated all the time.

X: I guess now we are coming back again to where we've started – to conflicting temporalities overlapping; you remember my crisis looking out of the window and facing the same image as the day before but knowing that everything has changed. Let's say the city means an actually existing environment and at the same time it represents an image that one can associate with television, a novel or a movie. Let's even say that – to speak with a Deleuzian terminology – that this virtual and actual meaning of the urban image is part of our daily experience; do you think we can actively produce such an ambivalence of the virtual and the actual environment, or is it just a product of our perception? In other words: is the difference you're talking about unavoidable, or a political potential?

Y: ...well, if some years ago the primary agenda seemed to get rid of the subject,

there might be a need today to get rid of space.

X: ...to get rid of space in order to produce it?

Y: ...to get rid of the concept of space as a representation of identity, to get rid of space as a territorial representation of culture. Whereas subjectivity meanwhile is commonly already understood in terms of a performative, ongoing construction and negotiation of identity, space still seems to play the role of a physical backdrop, a seemingly safe harbour for free floating subjectivities.

X: ...the notion of space as a container...

Y: ...just think of all the unsolvable conflicts about nationalities and their territorial definitions. Isn't there an incredible anachronism in these attempts to synchronise a geographical territory with an identity defined by culture?

Actively producing this difference could mean not to be quite at home in your home, to engage in alienating yourself from your home, your national identity. Thinking of urbanistic practice, could it mean to abandon the idea of a finished project, to accommodate yourself in a space created by a delay of the functional definition of a building?

X: ...a delay of the functional definition? ... yes, I basically agree with you. The only thing that comes into my mind is an area that was discussed in the realm of postmodern geography. I guess it was Edward Soja who was referring to the mechanisms of capitalism and especially the spatial mechanisms of capitalism. He said that there is a capitalist interest in the difference of spaces.

Y: ...and different values...

X: Yes, what once was the centre of interests may find itself on the margins a couple of years later, and *vice versa*: places that were located at the margins create just a potential for new investments and profit. So there is a capitalistic interest in the differences of spaces and in the flux of their meanings or values. I guess what would be important is to definitely insist on a notion of difference; but to understand that the difference is an immanent quality of space itself. And if the difference is an immanent quality of space itself ... then every definition of it is limited or delayed. In that sense the meaning of a house or a district or even a nation is based on a process of agreement and disagreement ... as a never-ending story.

Y: ...a profane version of the sublime.

X: If you are talking about the delay of functions then we could propose a map for a city which is marked by temporal intensities, ... like the body without organs of Deleuze and Guattari.

Y: A temporal intensity? What could that be? ... a spectacle...

X: ...no, not a spectacle, just something that is linked to laughter ... e.g. jokes, a kind of wit, because they allow you to express something important or embarrassing without saying it directly.

Y: ...a joke?

X: ...yes, a joke, that hits you directly but in an indirect way. Sometimes you even say the opposite of what you want to tell, but nevertheless ... everyone understands it in the right way. – Imagine there is a building you don't like or a district loaded with problems; it could be worth the test: instead of looking for the better version, for the seemingly ideal architectural or urbanistic solution just to make a copy of the problem, yes, to reproduce the problem.

Y: The reproduction of a problem as its solution?

X: Take Las Vegas ... Las Vegas is from my point of view the perfect reproduction of problems, of European problems; e.g. they copy Venice and represent their inside as just an European outside; and nevertheless the people like it. Or imagine a reproduction of Tallinn, just as it is; the one thing is that the people will look at exactly the same image totally different and even use it totally different. Probably they would even like what they hate in the original and *vice versa*. In other words: if you want to get rid of a problem, reproduce it!

Y: Which is exactly, what groups like Crimson or Joost Meuwissen's One-Architecture try to do in their practice. And what's an important effect in the strategy of copying materialized structures, is that a building can be used as a quote, as a representation of a building. In that sense it is then obviously located within language, within meaning. And since meaning therefore is primarily produced on a two-dimensional map, it becomes a surface-effect. Which is what I meant by getting rid of space – especially space conceived as a physical entity, or as an original, if you like ... Just like the idea of an 'autonomous or authentic' subject was criticized for its neglect of the immanent social and political constructs, the idea of a materialized original is questioned. And for good reasons ... when you think of reproducing built structures, you shift the question of space into a problem of perception, and locate it within representation, within meaning and within difference. As an effect, on the one hand you lose the weight of the original's materiality and on the other hand, you question a linear understanding of time conceived as history. Which brings me back once again to our earlier discussion – What is the role of temporality in a thinking of space as a surface effect, as representation? Can we think difference in terms of temporalities? Can we utilize the temporality inscribed

in the process of negotiating space, negotiating buildings? A reproduction can be one way of opening up a delay, a time-gap, which attacks the idea of the original or history; another strategy could be to actively disconnect the built structure from its meaning, to renegotiate the meaning and the function of buildings while they are underway. It could mean to shift architecture into the realm of desire produced by temporal gaps in the negotiation of meaning.

X: well, ... if we are talking about temporalities and delays I guess it could be important to define their differences. Otherwise talking about time, delays and negotiations could mean just to keep the things open, not to decide their final aim. The short version of this practice could be called 'waiting', with no clear idea in mind what we are waiting for. Maybe it is necessary to clearly define temporality and delay as immanent moments of the present tense. In other words: talking about space means to talk about the meanings it actually represents but as well about the meanings it could represent but doesn't. This potential of representing something that could be represented but isn't is decisive for temporality, for temporal gaps. E.g. hegemony is nothing else than a culture of repressed meanings. If we are talking about the repressed meanings of space then we are already in the realm of the discourse on space, or even more precisely: in the space of the discourse itself. Because the discourse on space unfolds itself right between the represented and repressed meanings. But the question is now: how can we describe the space of discourse? Can we make it visible, can we build a space for negotiation? I'm afraid the answer will be 'no'. Because according to the relation of the representation and its repressed meanings it is clear that this relation concerns every spatial effect. So to put it differently: It was Sigmund Freud talking about the uncanny and then Anthony Vidler talking about the architectural uncanny. They said that there is no uncanny thing as such, but everything can suddenly appear as uncanny, everything that represents a home and the homely can suddenly appear as unhomely. Maybe what we have to do is just to say discourse instead of the uncanny. From that point of view the discourse is a haunted space, and the discourse's building is a ghosthouse.

Y: The idea of the house is already one main metaphor of discourse itself. Spatiality always is inscribed in language and in discourse, but at the same time the question of the spatiality of the discourse seems to remain unasked, or should we say, repressed? But, as you said, how to describe the space of discourse? As Mark Wigley has analysed it, the definition of space itself cannot simply be interrogated by the architectural discourse, even if it seems to be a

primary subject of this discipline. Somehow the definition of space seems to be located in a repressed ideological foundation, that seems to precede theory. It is protected from analysis by this discourse itself. It is this naturalisation, this *a priori* of ideas about space that has to be questioned.

X: In order to get rid of the space as container...

Y: ...and therefore the definition of the city according to Victor Burgin is crucial: The city is at the same time an actually existing environment, and a city in a novel, a film, a photograph, a city seen on television and so on. In this sense space functions as a surface, a projection plane, a screen, on which spatial effects are acted out, can be negotiated.

X: Well, if you are talking about spatial effects and surfaces ... do you know what comes into my mind ... well, I don't know if I should say it ... but I guess it has to do with it ... a combination of spatial effects and temporality ... we all have seen it, we witnessed it ... we have all been shocked by it ... we are all victims of its effects ... do you know what I have in mind?! September 11th and the collapse of the world trade centre ... a combination of spatial effects and temporality. This is the perfect paradigm for a discursive space, a space of the uncanny, a ghost house now. A mixture of actual reality and its translation into a pure image broadcasted around the world and present everywhere. So called 'ground zero' is nothing more than the return of the repressed. What is visible now is the pure space, the naked space that was always there but repressed by the giant towers. And the pure and uncanny space initiates a discourse on more than space. The only problem is that the discourse is really so uncanny that they try to get rid of it and fill the empty spot as quickly as possible. Instead of keeping ground zero as the perfect paradigm for a discursive space, they try to put action and war in place of it.

Y: ...and to install a regime of inside and outside again...

X: ...but the discourse around the naked space has its effects everywhere, this ground zero functions as a global screen ... To put it differently: What was lost there, the building, now one can find it all over the world, as a phantasma, as a projection. Before we had just one world trade centre, but since it's gone we have at least 6 billions of them...

Y: ...yes, I would agree, but don't forget one interesting detail: the world trade centre consisted of two almost identical buildings. One was already the perfect copy of the other, its double or better: its *Doppelgänger*, one paradigmatic figure describing the phenomenon of the uncanny. And the way they were positioned: they were not really standing side by side like twins would, but they were

mirrored by a diagonal axis. So the one was always the shadow of the other building in a way ... something like a camouflage game – as if the building wasn't daring to say 'look at me – here I am', but more something like: 'Oh, no, I wasn't meant, maybe the other one?'. A building already quoting itself, a building already embodying a structural ambivalence.

X: ...the reproduction of a problem...

Y: ...a building that never meant an original, authentic self, insofar it already belonged to a different regime of looks and politics of representation. And the logic of the attacks just viscosly followed this mediated nature of its identity, or better its image. And what the effect of the attack is concerned, it was maybe less a symbol that was destroyed, but an embodied structural ambiguity. But as you mentioned, the search for simple answers seems even more uncanny now.

X: ...if you're talking about the *Doppelgänger*, a notion of the return of the repressed, there is another temporal figure that comes into my mind. And this temporal figure appears as well as a form of reproduction.

Y: ...yes? ...

X: The phenomenon I'm talking about is the *déjà vu* – in other words: the feeling you have experienced something already some time ago and you find yourself in the perfect reproduction of time, but being very aware of your simultaneous present. With a *déjà vu* the reality appears as a *Doppelgänger*, as the return of a repressed and parallel reality. Like here and now, in this space: Don't you have the feeling we've been here already, exactly in this room? At this table? You and me?

Ülekäigurada Kokkuvõte

(Linna)ruumi mõistet määratlevad mitmesugused elemendid. Kognitiivse Urbanismi Büroo (asutatud 1999) keskendub peamiselt ruumiliste praktikate mittemateriaalsetele aspektidele, linnaplaneerimisest, meediast ja representatsioonipoliitikast tulenevale ruumide imagopoliitikale. Nende imagote konstrueerimise protsessis on põhirolli mänginud arhitektuur ja linnakujundus. Alates 1960. aastaist on linnaruumi puudutavad diskussioonid laiendanud ruumi mõistet mõjutavate tegurite ringi. Teisalt osutasid Henri Lefebvre'i ja Michel de Certeau poolt algatatud teoreetilised arutlused ruumi ühiskondlikele aspektidele, meetodeile, kuidas kasutada ja kaasata struktuure nende algset funktsiooni muutes. Samal ajal arutlesid teised teoreetikud, nagu näiteks Manuel Castells, meedia tähenduslikkuse ning meedia poolt loodava ruumi üle, mis võib paikneda ükskõik kus. Vaid kümnekond aastat hiljem, 1970. aastail ja 1980. aastate alguses, hakati ruumidiskussioonides tähelepanu pöörama majanduslikele aspektidele: näiteks võib tuua Fredric Jamesoni hüperruumi mõiste või Saskia Sasseni globaliseerumisprotsessi analüüsid. Postmodernistlikud geograafid, nagu Edward Soja, jätkasid seda suunda. Teiselt poolt püüdsid psühhoanalüüsil põhinevad teooriad, feminism, soo- ja postkoloniaalsed uuringud mõtestada inimsubjekti kui representatsioonipoliitika poolt määratletud ühiskondlike ja kultuuriliste tegurite tulemust, mida väljendatakse identiteedipoliitika abil. Uue paradigma taotlemise asemel on kaasajal päevakorral kõik kirjeldatud aspektid, kõikjal ja üheaegselt toimuva väga keeruka protsessina. Väljakutse ei seisne mitte selle protsessi lõpliku versiooni piiritlemises, vaid erinevate valdkondade vahel leiduvate lõhedega arvestamises. Kognitiivse Urbanismi Büroo keskendub soovile luua ja kasutada ruumi ruumikuvandite kaudu. Büroo loob tingimusi uurimaks subjektiivsuse konstrueerimist ning tajupoliitikat kui ruumilisust loovat faktorit. Büroo tegutseb kunsti, urbanismi ja teooria vahele jääval alal. Et vältida kinnistunud ruumimõistmist ning -kujutisi, põhineb Kognitiivse Urbanismi Büroo tegevus dialoogidel, mis on lõpmatud, kuid mitte ülevad, kõneledes ruumist ja olles seeläbi samuti ruumilised.